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SECURITIZATION AND POST-CRISIS 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Steven L. Schwarcz†   
There are few types of securities as 
internationally traded as those issued in 
securitization (also spelled securitisation) 
transactions.  The post-financial crisis regulatory 
responses to securitization in the United States and 
Europe are, at least in part, political and ad hoc.  To 
achieve a more systematic regulatory framework, 
this Essay examines how existing regulation should 
be supplemented by identifying the market-failure 
causes that apply distinctively to securitization and 
analyzing how they could be addressed.  Among 
other things, the Essay argues that Europe’s 
regulatory framework for simple, transparent, and 
standardised (STS) securitizations goes a long way 
towards addressing complexity as a cause of market 
failure, and that the United States should consider a 
similar regulatory approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are few types of securities as internationally 
issued and traded as the debt securities—often called asset-
backed securities (ABS) or, when specifically backed by 
mortgage loans, mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
1—issued 
in securitization transactions.
2
  European investors 
commonly invest in ABS issued in U.S. securitization 
transactions,
3
 and vice versa.
4
 
Securitization epitomizes the disintermediation of bank 
credit that is characteristic of the so-called shadow banking 
system.
5
  In a typical securitization transaction, a sponsor 
 
 
1
 This Essay will use the broader term, ABS, to include MBS. 
 
2
 In Europe, securitization is spelled securitisation. 
 
3
 Cf. Carol Bertaut et al., ABS Inflows to the United States and the Global 
Financial Crisis 5-7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
17350, 2011), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17350 [https://perma.cc/V5HC-TTD2] 
(describing the flow of funds from Europe into U.S. ABS). 
 
4
 See, e.g., Thomas Hale, Lloyds Taps Overseas Appetite for British ABS, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015, 5:05 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/19d699e4-
726f-11e5-bdb1-e6e4767162cc.html#axzz4GVbLdA65 
[https://perma.cc/R6GZ-FVWU]. 
 
5
 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: 
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will purchase a pool of loans or other rights to payment 
(financial assets) from firms, such as mortgage lenders, 
originating those assets (originators) and sell them to a 
special purpose entity (SPE).
6
  The SPE will issue securities 
to investors, repayable from the periodic financial asset 
payments.  Securitization enables originators to multiply 
their available funding by selling off their loans for cash, 
from which they can make new loans.  Otherwise the lenders 
would have to carry the loans on their books and recoup the 
principal over many years.
7
 
It is generally agreed that securitization’s abuses 
contributed to the global financial crisis (financial crisis).
8
  
Repayment of ABS issued in certain highly leveraged 
securitization transactions, usually called “ABS CDO” 
transactions,
9
 was so “extremely sensitive to cash-flow 
variations” that, when “the cash-flow assumptions turned 
out to be wrong, many of these . . . [highly rated securities] 
defaulted or were downgraded.”10  That, in turn, sparked a 
loss of confidence in the value of credit ratings and highly 
rated debt securities generally.
11
 
The regulatory responses to securitization in the United 
States and Europe are, at least in part, ad hoc political 
reactions to the financial crisis.  Parts I and II of this Essay 
explain, and Part III compares and critiques these 
responses.  Thereafter, Part IV of the Essay examines how 
existing regulation could be made more systematic by 
identifying the market-failure causes that apply distinctively 
to securitization and analyzing how they could be addressed. 
I 
U.S. REGULATORY RESPONSES 
The U.S. regulatory responses to securitization are 
primarily embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act and in part 
embodied in the U.S. implementation of the Basel III capital 
 
Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 
(2014). 
 
6
 See Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1292–93 (2012). 
 
7
 See id. at 1295–98. 
 
8
 Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization, Structured Finance, and Covered 
Bonds, 39 J. CORP. L. 129, 130 (2013). 
 
9
 The term ABS CDO refers to a securitization of collateralized debt 
obligations.  Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1285. 
 
10
 Id. 
 
11
 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 131. 
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requirements.  These responses conceptually fall into four 
categories: increasing disclosure, requiring risk-retention, 
reforming rating agencies, and imposing capital 
requirements.  As will be seen, there are strong parallels 
between the U.S. regulatory responses and the European 
regulatory responses.  In part, that is because securitization 
is such a relatively new approach to financing that 
regulators throughout the world are attempting to learn from 
each other.
12
  This represents the ultimate 
transnationalization of the law regarding debt. 
A. Disclosure 
Section 942(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act
13
 requires, for each 
issue of ABS,
14
 the disclosure of information regarding the 
financial assets backing each class (sometimes called 
“tranche”) of those securities.15  The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) is directed to promulgate rules 
expanding that disclosure requirement (e.g., standardizing 
data disclosure).
16
  Those rules have not yet been finally 
issued. 
B. Risk-Retention 
To attempt to address moral hazard resulting from the 
originate-to-distribute model of loan origination (under 
which lenders sell off their loans as they are made), thereby 
improving the quality of the financial assets underlying 
securitization transactions, Dodd-Frank Act section 941 
requires securitizers—who are effectively originators or 
sponsors of the securitization
17—to retain a portion of the 
 
 
12
 Cf. Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, but Not 
Lawless, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 255, 274–78 (1998) (arguing that the law of 
securitization is developing through a form of shared international lex 
mercatoria). 
 
13
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 77g(c) (2012). 
 
14
 This requirement does not currently apply, although the SEC is still 
considering whether it should apply, to ABS issued in private placements 
under SEC Rule 144A.  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 243, 249 
(2016); KIRKLAND & ELLIS, NOT SO FAST: THE SEC ADOPTS REG AB II 1 & app. C 
at 1 (2014) (stating that the 144A market is unaffected by the disclosure 
requirements in Reg. AB II). 
 
15
 Securitizers are also required to disclose fulfilled and unfulfilled 
repurchase requests across all trusts aggregated by them so that investors 
may identify assets with clear loan-underwriting deficiencies.  Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 943, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7. 
 
16
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77g(d). 
 
17
 More technically, a securitizer is either an issuer of ABS or a person 
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credit risk (so-called “skin in the game”) for any financial 
asset (including mortgage loans, other than Qualified 
Residential Mortgages
18
) that the securitizer, through the 
issuance of an asset-backed security, transfers, sells, or 
conveys to a third party.  For example, securitizers are 
required to retain at least 5% of the credit risk for non-
qualified residential mortgage-loan assets that they transfer, 
sell, or convey through the issuance of an asset-backed 
security.
19
  The regulations prohibit securitizers from directly 
or indirectly hedging or otherwise transferring the credit risk 
they are required to retain with respect to an asset.
20
 
C. Rating-Agency Reform 
To increase the reliability of credit ratings issued by 
rating agencies, section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires 
the SEC to prescribe regulations requiring each nationally 
recognized statistical rating organization (NRSRO, the U.S. 
regulatory term for a rating agency) to include “in any report 
accompanying a credit rating . . . [a description of the] 
representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms 
available to investors . . .  and how the[se] differ from the 
representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms in 
issuances of similar securities.”21  The Dodd-Frank Act also 
 
who organizes and initiates a securitization transaction by selling or 
transferring financial assets either directly or indirectly, including through an 
affiliate, to the issuer of the ABS.  15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(3). 
 
18
 Qualified Residential Mortgage (QRM) is a designation based on a 
borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage loan at origination, a verification of 
the borrower’s income, and certain other relevant considerations.  12 C.F.R. 
§ 1026 (2016). 
 
19
 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B). 
 
20
 Dodd-Frank Act section 946 also requires the chairman of the Financial 
Services Oversight Council (FSOC) to study the macroeconomic effects of the 
risk-retention requirements, with emphasis placed on potential beneficial 
effects with respect to stabilizing the real estate market.  This study shall 
include an analysis of the effects of risk-retention on real estate asset price 
bubbles, including a retrospective estimate of what fraction of real estate 
losses may have been averted had such requirements been in force in recent 
years; an analysis of the feasibility of minimizing real estate bubbles by 
proactively adjusting the percentage of risk-retention that must be borne by 
creditors and securitizers of real estate debt, as a function of regional or 
national market conditions; a comparable analysis for proactively adjusting 
mortgage origination requirements; an assessment of whether such proactive 
adjustments should be made by an independent regulator (or in a formulaic 
and transparent manner); and an assessment of whether such adjustments 
should take place independently or in concert with monetary policy. 
 
21
 Disclosure Required by Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 
4,489, 4,490 (Jan. 26, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 232, 240, 
249). 
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significantly reduces reliance on rating agencies by banks 
and federal agencies.
22
 
D. Capital Requirements 
Capital requirements are intended to protect firms 
against economic shocks.  Capital requirements apply to 
securitization transactions by requiring investors in ABS to 
hold more capital than they would be required to hold for 
investments in other types of securities.
23
  In general, the 
United States follows the Basel III capital requirements, 
which mandate higher capital requirements for investments 
in ABS.
24
 
The Federal Reserve and two other federal agencies
25
 
have also adopted a final rule combining the Basel III capital 
requirements and the Dodd-Frank Act framework to 
implement Basel III’s liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) in the 
United States.
26
  The LCR requires banks to maintain a 
minimum amount of high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs)—
assets that can be easily and immediately converted into 
cash with little or no loss of value
27—to withstand a 30-day 
stress scenario; a bank’s stock of HQLAs must be at least 
100% of its total net cash outflows over the 30-day stress 
period.  In defining what constitutes HQLAs and which 
HQLAs must be discounted for purposes of computing the 
100% requirement, Basel III disfavors investments in ABS, 
disallowing some to qualify as HQLAs and discounting 
others as much as 50% for purposes of computing the 100% 
requirement.
28
  The U.S. implementation of the LCR is even 
 
 
22
 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7. 
 
23
 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III DOCUMENT: REVISIONS 
TO THE SECURITIZATION FRAMEWORK (Dec. 11, 2014). 
 
24
 Liquidity Coverage Ratio, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,440, 61,440 (Oct. 10, 2014) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 249). 
 
25
 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
 
26
 Liquidity Coverage Ratio, 79 Fed. Reg. at 61,440. 
 
27
 Id. 
 
28
 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY 
COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS ¶¶ 49–54 (2013).  Even 
covered bonds are disfavored, being subject to a 15% discount.  Id. ¶ 52(b).  
Covered bonds are similar to ABS, but there are some fundamental 
differences.  Most notably, covered bonds are supported by a “dynamic” cover 
pool and have full recourse if their underlying financial assets turn out to be 
insufficient to pay them in full.  See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 142–44; 
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 66 BUS. LAW. 561, 
566–68 (2011). 
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stricter.
29
 
II 
EUROPEAN REGULATORY RESPONSES 
The European regulatory responses to securitization 
conceptually fall into five categories: increasing disclosure, 
requiring risk-retention, reforming rating agencies, imposing 
capital requirements, and requiring certain due diligence.  
Except for adding due diligence requirements, these 
categories parallel the U.S. regulatory responses to 
securitization. 
In discussing the European regulatory responses to 
securitization, I first will focus on the plan unveiled in late 
September 2015,
30
 in which the European Parliament and 
Council proposed regulations laying down common rules on 
securitization and creating a European framework for 
simple, transparent, and standardised (STS) securitization.
31
  
A primary goal of these EU-proposed regulations is to 
incentivize STS securitizations—in contrast to more opaque 
and complex securitization transactions—as an effective 
funding channel to the economy.
32
  To avoid confusion, the 
reader should be aware that although the STS securitization 
framework has many parallels to the so-called simple, 
transparent, and comparable (STC) securitization criteria 
 
 
29
 Basel III allows countries to set stricter standards than those supplied 
by the Basel Committee.  See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra 
note 28, ¶ 5.  The U.S. implementation is stricter because it excludes certain 
types of ABS that would qualify as HQLAs, such as 
residential MBS and covered bonds.  See DAVISPOLK, U.S. BASEL III LIQUIDITY 
COVERAGE RATIO FINAL RULE: VISUAL MEMORANDUM 15–16 (2014), 
http://usbasel3.com/docs/Final%20LCR%20Visual%20Memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7GFN-BG4S]. 
 
30
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Laying Down Common Rules on Securitisation and Creating a European 
Framework for Simple, Transparent and Standardised Securitisation and 
Amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU and 
Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012, COM (2015) 472 final 
(Sept. 30, 2015) [hereinafter EU-proposed regulations]. 
 
31
 The existing regulatory framework governing EU securitization is a 
hodge-podge that includes the Capital Requirements Regulation for banks, the 
Solvency II Directive for insurers, the UCITS and AIFMD directives for asset 
managers, legal provisions on information disclosure and transparency laid 
down in the Credit Rating Agency Regulation and in the Prospectus Directive, 
and other provisions on the prudential treatment of securitization in 
Commission legislative proposals such as the Bank Structural Reform and 
Money Market Funds.  Id. at 4. 
 
32
 See Council Regulation 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1, 16 (stating that 
the primary purpose is ensuring the operation of vital services to the real 
economy while limiting the risk of moral hazard). 
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proposed in July 2015 by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and the Board of the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (operating together as the Task 
Force on Securitization Markets),
33
 the STS criteria are 
proposed as EU law.
34
 
A. Disclosure 
By incentivizing STS securitizations, the EU-proposed 
regulations implicitly promote disclosure.  Disclosure is 
much more likely to be effective for securitizations that are 
simple, transparent, and standardized than for more 
complex securitization transactions.
35
 
Chapter 3 of the EU-proposed regulations defines STS 
securitization.
36
  Article 8 of Chapter 3 describes the 
simplicity requirement, which includes a true sale or similar 
transfer of the underlying financial assets.
37
  Additionally, 
 
 
33
 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION & BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. 
COMM’NS, CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING SIMPLE, TRANSPARENT AND COMPARABLE 
SECURITIZATIONS (2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d332.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A76M-GSXG]. 
 
34
 Although a technical comparison of the STS and STC criteria is beyond 
this Essay’s scope, my research assistant Dominic Lerario is writing an 
excellent research paper making such a comparison.  See Dominic M. Lerario, 
The Basel Committee and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions’ “Criteria for Identifying Simple, Transparent and Comparable 
Securitizations”: Not So Simple 5 (Jan. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author).  Lerario notes that although “the uneven application and 
interpretation of just the STC criteria creates the potential for regulatory 
fragmentation, inconsistency and ultimately regulatory arbitrage, the prospect 
of a competing, albeit similar, STS framework multiplies these concerns.”  Id.; 
cf. Katie McCaw & Jonathan Walsh, Baker & McKenzie, Where Are We in 
Developing a Definition of “High Quality Securitization”?, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 28, 
2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=da574ef3-239f-48c7-
9473-4a7755ab3518 [https://perma.cc/559H-XYZR] (“The release of differing 
global, European and national proposals for . . . [high quality securitizations] 
appears to somewhat undermine the long-established (or at least, well-
understood) hierarchical order around the global implementation of prudential 
regulation: EU legislation implements global policy; national rules transpose 
EU legislation.  To reverse-engineer this natural order risks establishing an 
EU-wide (or national) regime for . . . [high quality securitizations] that is then 
subject to amendment as global principles are established.  Given that the 
global investor community will be seeking a degree of comfort from 
the . . . [high quality securitizations] designation . . . , a single, globally-
accepted definition of . . . [high quality securitizations], and the criteria that 
denote it, must be established.”). 
 
35
 The U.S. regulations contemplate only limited standardization, and they 
impose that as a requirement rather than as an incentive.  See supra notes 
16–18 and accompanying text (discussing standardizing data and disclosing 
such data). 
 
36
 EU-proposed regulations, supra note 30, at 36. 
 
37
 Id. 
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those financial assets must themselves meet simplicity 
requirements, including being homogenous, creditworthy 
(e.g., not in default, not from obligors that are insolvent or 
have adverse credit history or low credit scores), and not 
constituting already securitized financial assets.
38
 
Article 9 of Chapter 3 sets forth the standardization 
requirements.
39
  Among other things, interest-rate risk and 
exchange-rate risk must be hedged and, other than to effect 
such hedging, the underlying financial assets cannot include 
or be buttressed by derivatives (as would be the case in a 
“synthetic” securitization).40  The transaction documentation 
must clearly specify the obligations, duties, and 
responsibilities of the servicer and back-up servicer to 
ensure efficient and continuing servicing of the financial 
assets and must also include clear provisions facilitating the 
timely resolution of conflicts among different classes of 
investors.
41
 
Article 10 of Chapter 3 sets forth the transparency 
requirements.
42
  Among other things, the originator or 
sponsor must provide investors a cash flow model and also 
provide them access to information on historical default, 
delinquency, and loss performance for substantially similar 
financial assets to those being securitized.
43
  Also, a sample 
of the underlying financial assets shall be subject to external 
verification by an independent party.
44
  I later discuss why 
these criteria for STS securitizations are sensible.
45
 
B. Risk-Retention 
Article 4 of the EU-proposed regulations also creates, for 
 
 
38
 Id. 
 
39
 Id. at 38–39. 
 
40
 Id. 
 
41
 Id. 
 
42
 Id. at 39. 
 
43
 Id. 
 
44
 Even securitizations engaged in by asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) conduits can qualify as STS if the commercial paper has maturities not 
exceeding a year, the conduit provides investors with monthly data on all of its 
collections and liabilities, and the underlying financial assets are of the same 
asset type and have a weighted average life of no more than two years (with 
underlying financial assets having a life of more than three years).  See 
Finance Alert: European Commission Releases Proposals on 
Securitization, KAYE SCHOLER (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.kayescholer.com/in-
the-market/publications/client_alerts/20151006-finance-alert-european-
commission-releases-proposals-on-securitization [https://perma.cc/W33E-
CMSP]. 
 
45
 See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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most securitizations, a risk-retention requirement similar to 
the U.S. risk-retention requirement.
46
  To avoid a recurrence 
of the allegedly flawed originate-to-distribute model, the 
originator or sponsor must retain an unhedged material net 
economic interest in the securitization of at least 5%. 
C. Rating-Agency Reform 
European regulators have sought to increase the 
transparency and accountability of rating agencies.  Most 
significantly, they require rating agencies to disclose the fees 
charged to their clients.
47
 
D. Capital Requirements 
The Basel III capital requirements, already discussed in 
the U.S. regulatory context,
48
 also apply in Europe.  As 
discussed, Basel III mandates higher capital requirements 
for investments in ABS.  It also disfavors investments in ABS 
for purposes of satisfying its liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). 
E. Due Diligence Requirements 
Chapter 2 of the EU-proposed regulations imposes due 
diligence requirements for all securitizations, even STS 
securitizations.
49
  These not only require standard pre-
closing due diligence but also post-closing due diligence, 
including requiring investors
50
 to perform regular stress 
tests on the cash flows and financial asset values supporting 
the underlying securitization exposures.
51
 
III 
CRITIQUING THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN REGULATORY RESPONSES 
The responses of U.S. and European regulators are still 
ongoing.  However, the contours of their regulatory 
approaches are apparent.  In previous work, I have identified 
 
 
46
 See supra subpart I.B. 
 
47
 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/1 of 30 September 2014, 
2014 O.J. (L 2) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R0001&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/8XJV-8A4Q]. 
 
48
 See supra subpart I.D. 
 
49
 EU-proposed regulations, supra note 30, at 29–30. 
 
50
 This refers to institutional investors, which generally constitute the vast 
majority of investors in EU securitization transactions.  See, e.g., MIGUEL 
SEGOVIANO ET AL., SECURITIZATION: THE ROAD AHEAD 21–23 (2015) (describing 
the securitization investor base in Europe and the United States). 
 
51
 EU-proposed regulations, supra note 30, at 29–30. 
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strengths and weaknesses in the regulation of 
securitization.
52
  I next build on that work in light of what we 
now know about the regulatory paths taken on both sides of 
the Atlantic, beginning by critiquing the conceptual 
categories. 
A. Critique of Disclosure 
Requiring increased disclosure in securitization 
transactions is unlikely by itself to be meaningful.  Prior to 
the financial crisis, the risks associated with complex 
securitization transactions and their underlying financial 
assets, including subprime mortgage loans, were fully 
disclosed; but that failed to prevent the catastrophic collapse 
of the securitization markets.
53
  The problem is that 
disclosure alone can be ineffective for highly complex 
securitization products.  For example, the task of 
deciphering a prospectus, hundreds of pages long and full of 
detailed technical and legal phraseology, is usually 
burdensome even for the most sophisticated institutional 
managers—so they often over rely on credit ratings, 
especially if other financial institutions are investing in the 
same types of securities.
54
 
The EU’s disclosure approach, tied to incentivizing STS 
securitizations, is more likely to be effective than the U.S. 
approach because of those transactions’ relative 
standardized simplicity.
55
  Nor should that standardized 
simplicity unduly restrict the economic utility of 
securitization.
56
  In previous work, I have criticized attempts 
at government-imposed standardization for its inhibiting 
effect on financial innovation.
57
  The STS approach, in 
 
 
52
 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
1313, 1321 (2009) [hereinafter The Future of Securitization]; Steven L. 
Schwarcz, The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture—Protecting Investors in 
Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd-Frank Help, or Hurt?, 72 LA. L. REV. 
591, 598–602 (2012). 
 
53
 This discussion is based in part on Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s 
Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109 (2008). 
 
54
 See id. at 1114. 
 
55
 Nonetheless, at least one international law firm predicts that significant 
financial modeling will still be required for investors to understand STS 
securitizations.  Finance Alert: European Commission Releases Proposals on 
Securitization, supra note 44. 
 
56
 This Essay assumes that securitization can provide economic utility. As 
discussed, it can be an important means to generate capital.  See infra note 58 
and accompanying text. 
 
57
 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 240–41 (2009). 
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contrast, does not require standardization but merely 
rewards standardized simplicity—and it appears to 
contemplate a significant degree of market flexibility in 
achieving that simplicity.  Furthermore, STS securitizations 
should encompass the basic types of securitization 
transactions that were originated in the 1980s and became 
economically significant during the 1990s, when the SEC 
described them as “becoming one of the dominant means of 
capital formation in the United States.”58  Incentivizing these 
types of transactions appears sensible. 
B. Critique of Risk-Retention 
As mentioned, the intended purpose of risk-retention is 
to reduce moral hazard resulting from the originate-to-
distribute model of loan origination, thereby improving the 
quality of the financial assets underlying securitization 
transactions.
59
  It is unclear whether a legal risk-retention 
requirement will improve financial asset quality. 
In my experience, the market itself has always mandated 
risk-retention.  Prior to the financial crisis, for example, 
originators and sponsors of securitizations usually retained 
risk on the financial assets, typically mortgage loans, 
included in those transactions.
60
  The problem, however, was 
that originators and sponsors, as well as investors, generally 
overvalued those assets.
61
  That is in part because of the 
irrational characteristic of asset-price bubbles: the 
unfounded belief that downside risk—in that case, the risk 
of home prices plummeting—will never be realized.62 
It is also unclear whether the originate-to-distribute 
model of loan origination actually caused morally hazardous 
behavior, thereby lowering mortgage-loan underwriting 
standards.  In theory, separation of origination and 
ownership should not matter because ultimate owners 
should assess and value risk before buying their ownership 
 
 
58
 Investment Company Act, Release No. 19105, 57 Fed. Reg. 56248, 
56248 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided in connection with the issuance of Rule 3a-7 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940). 
 
59
 See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 
60
 Ryan Bubb & Pradas Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How 
Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—From 
Themselves, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 1539, 1547, 1881–83 (2015). 
 
61
 See id. at 1554. 
 
62
 See id. at 1546 (“[O]veroptimism about future house prices in a bubble 
leads market participants to underweigh the probability of default and blunts 
the incentive benefits of risk-retention.”).  The most infamous example of a 
bubble may be the 16th century Dutch tulip bulb bubble. 
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positions.
63
  If the originate-to-distribute model did not 
cause a lowering of underwriting standards, then 
risk-retention requirements may have little effect.
64
 
Risk-retention might not merely be insufficient but also 
dangerous, leading to a “mutual misinformation” problem.  
By retaining residual risk portions of certain complex 
securitization products they were selling prior to the 
financial crisis, securities underwriters may actually have 
fostered false investor confidence, contributing to the 
crisis.
65
 
C. Critique of Rating-Agency Reform 
Much like the topic of disclosure, the Dodd-Frank Act 
authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules regulating the 
conduct and business of rating agencies, and yet the SEC 
has done relatively little in this area.
66
  What has been done 
has not addressed the conflicts of interest inherent in the 
issuer-pays model, a model that some believe played an 
important role in the inflated investment-grade ratings 
awarded to complex securitizations prior to the financial 
crisis.  In contrast, the EU-proposed regulations require the 
disclosure of those fees.
67
  While that does not totally relieve 
the conflict of interest in the issuer-pays model, it may serve 
to mitigate the conflict or at least reduce the appearance of 
impropriety. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also significantly reduces reliance 
on rating agencies by banks and federal agencies.
68
  This 
misses the point somewhat.  While reduced reliance on 
ratings may be beneficial in some respects, one should 
primarily seek to make credit ratings more reliable.
69
 
 
 
63
 Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 257 (arguing that even though lenders are 
better situated to make this evaluation than the ultimate owners, the latter 
should take steps to reduce, or to compensate for, any information 
asymmetry). 
 
64
 Cf. Kevin Villani, Risk-Retention Rules Set Up the Private Investor for 
Failure, AM. BANKER (Aug. 29, 2011), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/QRM-qualifying-residential-
mortgage-risk-retention-housing-private-investor-1041645-1.html 
[https://perma.cc/VK38-NK9S ] (arguing that lack of “skin in the game” was 
not responsible for financial firms’ “astronomical leverage”). 
 
65
 See Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 241–42. 
 
66
 Gretchen Morgenson, The Stone Unturned: Credit Ratings, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/business/the-stone-
unturned-credit-ratings.html [https://perma.cc/96LF-7KUA]. 
 
67
 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 
68
 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 
69
 Cf. SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015, U.S. SEC. & 
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D. Critique of Capital Requirements 
As discussed, capital requirements apply to 
securitization transactions by requiring investors in ABS to 
hold more capital than they would be required to hold for 
investments in other types of securities.  This Essay will not 
attempt to critique the general merits of capital 
requirements, merely their application to securitization 
transactions.
70
 
The requirement that investors hold more capital for 
investments in ABS has been subject to widespread industry 
criticism.
71
  Some criticize it as simply being “punitive” 
against securitization.
72
  Others contend the requirement is 
illogical, representing such a “very conservative tightening of 
capital standards” that investors in ABS will have to hold 
more regulatory capital than if they invested directly in the 
 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 22, 2015) 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-245.html 
[https://perma.cc/8JLU-ZKKT] (discussing the status of the enforcement 
action that the SEC brought against a major credit-rating agency in 
connection with the financial crisis). 
 
70
 There is controversy over how to calibrate the optimal level of capital 
required to ensure stability without sacrificing efficiency within the financial 
system.  See, e.g., Stephen Matteo Miller, The Circle of Crisis and Capital, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar 21, 2016, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2016-03-
21/keep-banks-capital-requirements-high-to-protect-against-financial-crises 
[https://perma.cc/D5K6-UQ8P].  Such a system would be highly complex and 
nuanced, such as the Basel II capital adequacy requirements.  Of course, 
those same requirements failed to prevent the financial crisis.  The response 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and U.S. and European 
regulators was to ratchet up capital requirements.  These reactions have been 
met with mixed responses by some and vigorous resistance by others.  See, 
e.g., Victoria McGrane & Leslie Scism, MetLife Suit Sets Up Battle Over 
Regulation, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 14, 2015, 12:16 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/metlife-to-challenge-systemically-important-tag-
1421152441. 
 
71
 Additional criticism has been voiced about the methodology for 
calculating the extra capital requirement.  For example, the Simplified 
Supervisory Formula Approach (SSFA) establishes a method for calculating the 
applicable risk weights for different levels of securitization exposures, with 
more subordinated exposures requiring higher risk weights.  BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 23, at 27.  Some are concerned over the 
complexity of calculating capital requirements under the SSFA.  Others are 
concerned over the requirement that, in applying the SSFA, investors must 
consider certain information that may be burdensome to obtain, if not 
unavailable.  If investors cannot consider that information, the regulator could 
impose up to a 1,250% risk weight.  See id. 
 
72
 FRENCH BANKING FEDERATION, FRENCH BANKING FEDERATION RESPONSE TO 
THE BCBS 269 CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE SECURITIZATION 
FRAMEWORK 6 (2014) 
http://www.fbf.fr/fr/files/9WQCEM/FBF_response_BCBS_Securitization_fra
mework_20140321.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BAE-RHJ5]. 
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financial assets backing those securities.
73
  Industry 
representatives therefore support “capital-neutrality,” 
requiring investors in ABS backed by first priority claims 
against financial assets to hold capital based on those 
underlying assets.
74
 
Whether or not there is merit to requiring investors to 
hold more capital for investments in ABS, the European STS 
framework allows investors in ABS that constitute STS 
securities to receive a 25% reduction in their capital 
surcharges.
75
  This is intended as a reflection of the reduced 
risk associated with simple, transparent, and standardised 
securitizations. 
E. Critique of Due Diligence Requirements 
As discussed, the EU-proposed regulations require 
institutional investors in securitization transactions to 
perform certain pre-closing and post-closing due diligence.
76
  
In my experience, the required due diligence is similar to 
what investors, or other parties (such as trustees), normally 
perform in securitization transactions.
77
  To that extent, 
these due diligence requirements could be viewed as 
paternalistic and unnecessary.
78
  Nonetheless, such 
requirements could have value to help assure adequate due 
diligence during another investor “feeding frenzy” for 
securitization products, as occurred prior to the financial 
crisis.
79
 
 
 
73
 WILLIAM PERRAUDIN, HIGH QUALITY SECURITISATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE PCS DEFINITION31 (2014) http://www.riskcontrollimited.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/High_Quality_Securitisation.pdf [https://perma.cc
/SZ7X-DEVC]. 
 
74
 See, e.g., FRENCH BANKING FEDERATION, supra note 72. 
 
75
 Huw Jones & Francesco Guarascio, EU to Ease Capital Rules for 
Banks, Insurers to Boost Economy, REUTERS, (Sept. 30, 2015, 9:38 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/30/us-eu-markets-regulations-
idUSKCN0RU16Q20150930 [https://perma.cc/LE6K-SSUL]. 
 
76
 See supra subpart II.E. 
 
77
 See The Future of Securitization, supra note 52, at 1318 (“Parties to, 
and investors in, securitization transactions must always be diligent to 
recognize and try to protect against the possibility that the underlying 
financial assets might, as in the case of subprime mortgage loans, fail in 
unexpected ways.”). 
 
78
 The only exception would be where investors fail to perform due 
diligence because of risk marginalization.  See infra note 94 and accompanying 
text. 
 
79
 See, e.g., SEGOVIANO  ET AL., supra note 50, at 5 (depicting in Figure 1 
the growth and collapse of securitized product issuance during 2003-2014); 
Suzanne Woolley, What’s Next, Securitized Bridge Tolls?, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. 
(Sept. 2, 1996, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1996-
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IV 
RETHINKING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Even if such responses would otherwise constitute a 
complete regulatory framework, Part III has shown that the 
U.S., and to some extent, the European, regulatory 
responses to securitization may be insufficient.  This should 
not be surprising; the post-crisis macroprudential regulation 
of finance
80
 is itself insufficient.  The European Central Bank 
Director General for Research summarized as follows the 
consensus reached at a recent Federal Reserve-sponsored 
conference: “Both monetary policy and macroprudential 
[regulatory] policy are not really very effective.”81  Part of the 
reason for this insufficiency is that the regulatory responses 
have been somewhat ad hoc, focusing on assembling a 
“toolbox” of regulatory “tools.”82 
This Essay next attempts to supplement these tools with 
a more systematic regulatory framework.  In a 
macroprudential context, I have attempted to think through 
what it is about finance that could cause systemic market 
failures, which need regulation to correct.  Subpart A below 
identifies these market-failure causes.  Thereafter, subpart B 
examines which market-failure causes can apply 
distinctively to securitization and, in that context, analyzes 
how they could be addressed. 
A. Identifying Market-Failure Causes 
In a macroprudential context, I have argued that finance 
has at least five fundamental causes of market failures that 
need regulation to correct: complexity, conflicts, 
complacency, change, and a type of tragedy of the commons 
(which I will call the “4Cs and the TOC”).83  Consider them in 
 
09-01/whats-next-securitized-bridge-tolls [https://perma.cc/S3ZS-Y88T] 
(describing the race to securitize different assets and quoting a Managing 
Director at Moody’s as saying “When everybody wants to securitize, and 
everyone is willing to buy, and everyone thinks nothing will go wrong, there 
gets to be a feeding-frenzy atmosphere”). 
 
80
 Macroprudential regulation refers to regulation intended to reduce 
systemic risk. 
 
81
 Binyamin Appelbaum, Skepticism Prevails on Preventing Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2015, at B1, B3 (quoting Luc Laeven) (article also observing the 
“troubling reality” that “policy makers have made little progress in figuring out 
how they might actually” prevent another financial crisis). 
 
82
 Cf. Robert Hockett, Implementing Macroprudential Finance-Oversight 
Policy: Legal Considerations 12–13 (Jan. 20, 2013) (unpublished draft 
prepared for the International Monetary Fund) (on file with author) (discussing 
the “emergent macroprudential toolkit as currently constituted”). 
 
83
 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional 
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turn. 
1. Complexity 
The first “C” is complexity, which may well be the 
greatest challenge to the financial system in the 21st 
century.
84
  Complexity causes at least three types of 
information failures.  First, it can make disclosure 
insufficient to eliminate information asymmetry (although 
disclosure certainly remains necessary).
85
  As discussed, the 
Dodd-Frank Act focuses heavily on disclosure as a 
solution.
86
  Because disclosure is insufficient, that focus will 
be insufficient.  Second, complexity makes understanding 
harder, which increases the chance of panics
87
 and also, like 
the Delphic Oracle, makes people prone to see what they 
want to see.  Finally, complexity heightens the risk of 
“mutual misinformation.”88 
2. Conflicts 
“Conflicts” refers to classic principal-agent conflicts.  
Traditionally, this market failure is viewed as a potential 
conflict between a firm’s owners (shareholders) and senior 
managers.
89
  In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act 
attempts to remedy that.
90
 
In a complex financial world, however, the greater 
conflict risk may be intra-firm: between a firm’s senior 
managers and its more analytically informed secondary (or 
middle) managers, such as vice presidents and senior 
analysts.
91
  Regulation could help to solve this problem by 
 
Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1443–46 (2016). 
 
84
 Cf. Manuel A. Utset, Financial System Engineering, 32 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 371, 389–93 (2013) (identifying complexity as the core problem 
resulting in systemic market failures). 
 
85
 See id. at 418–19. 
 
86
 See supra subpart I.A. 
 
87
 Cf. Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of 
Complexity, 68 J. FINANCE 2549, 2550 (2013) (arguing that complexity 
generates uncertainty, especially about counterparty exposure, which causes 
financial institutions to “retrench into a liquidity conservation mode” and 
possibly engage in fire sales of assets). 
 
88
 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 
89
 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and 
Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 822 (2012). 
 
90
 See, e.g., Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd-
Frank Act End too Big to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L.  L. REV. 1, 71–77 (2012). 
 
91
 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem 
of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 458–59 
(2009).  This Essay uses several examples to illustrate the intra-firm conflict, 
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requiring systemically important firms to pay secondary 
managers under longer-term compensation arrangements.  
But the ability of these managers to work anywhere creates 
an international collective action problem, requiring effective 
regulation to be global to avoid prejudicing the 
competitiveness of firms subject to particular national 
rules.
92
 
3. Complacency 
“Complacency” includes human irrationality, including 
the tendencies to over rely on heuristics, such as credit 
ratings, in order to try to simplify complexity; to see what we 
want to see in the face of uncertainty;
93
 and to panic.  I also 
use the term to include incentive failure: the human 
tendency to discount actual risk and to free-ride—failing to 
perform sufficient due diligence—that sometimes occurs 
when financial firms compete.
94
 
The information failure caused by complacency is 
difficult to correct.  Human nature cannot easily be changed, 
and increasing complexity can increase irrationality.
95
  Even 
incentive failure is hard to correct.  Although regulation 
could require—perhaps for certain large issuances of 
complex securities—that a minimum unhedged position be 
held by a single sophisticated investor in each class of 
securities, regulatory attempts to limit risk dispersion would 
have tradeoffs: increasing the potential for regulatory 
arbitrage, impairing the ability of parties to achieve 
negotiated market efficiencies, and possibly even increasing 
 
including the Value-at-Risk (VaR) model.  VaR measures the probable losses to 
a securities portfolio given a certain level of risk.  As the model became more 
widely accepted, firms began to compensate secondary managers for their 
ability to generate profits with low risk, as measured by VaR.  Secondary 
managers therefore turned to products with low VaR profiles, such as credit 
default swaps which generate small gains and seldom experience losses.  The 
secondary managers knew, but often did not inform their superiors, that when 
losses did occur they could be massive.  Id. at 460. 
 
92
 See id. at 466–69 (observing that realigning secondary manager 
compensation with the long-term health of a firm faces a collective action 
problem: firms will be reluctant to employ a contingent or deferred 
compensation structure because doing so would put the firm at a competitive 
disadvantage in attracting talented managers, and therefore regulation may be 
necessary to overcome this impasse). 
 
93
 Cf. supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (observing that 
complexity makes understanding harder, which, like the Delphic Oracle, 
makes people prone to see what they want to see). 
 
94
 I also refer to this as risk marginalization. 
 
95
 See supra text following note 86; see also Schwarcz, supra note 89, at 
821–22. 
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financial instability.
96
 
The information failure resulting from complacency will 
therefore be inevitable.  I later examine ex post mitigative 
regulation that could reduce the harmful systemic 
consequences of market failures.
97
 
4. Change 
This refers to the difficulty of regulating a constantly 
changing financial system.  Existing regulatory approaches 
suffer from two time-bound flaws.  One flaw is obvious: 
politics and human nature make financial regulation overly 
reactive to past crises, thereby unduly pinning regulation to 
the past.  Policymakers and regulators are aware of, and 
have been trying to address, that flaw.  But there is a less 
obvious, though arguably more fundamental, flaw: financial 
regulation is normally tethered to the financial architecture, 
including the distinctive design and structure of financial 
firms and markets, in place when the regulation is 
promulgated.  This flaw unduly pins regulation to the 
present.  Financial regulation must transcend that time-
bound architecture because without continuous monitoring 
and updating—which rarely occurs because it is costly and 
subject to political interference—present-day regulation can 
quickly become outmoded. 
5. Tragedy of the Commons 
Systemic risk in part results from a type of tragedy of 
the commons.  While the benefits of exploiting finite capital 
resources accrue to individual participants, the costs are 
distributed among many.  Individual market participants 
therefore have little incentive to limit their risk taking in 
order to reduce the systemic danger to other participants in 
the financial system.
98
  This is a tragedy of the commons 
 
 
96
 Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 516–
17 (2012).  Risk dispersion can create benefits such as reducing the 
asymmetry in market information and more efficiently allocating risks.  This is 
accomplished by shifting risk on financial assets to investors and other market 
participants who are better able to assess risk.  Risk dispersion can, however, 
also create market failures that cause market participants to misjudge or 
ignore potential correlations.  A prime example is investors’ mistaken belief 
that ABS provided an investment market that was uncorrelated with 
traditional debt markets.  To investors’ surprise, when ABS investments 
backed by subprime mortgage loans began defaulting, so did other ABS 
investments backed by other types of assets.  Id. at 493–94. 
 
97
 See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 
98
 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008).  
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insofar as market participants suffer from the actions of 
other market participants; it is a more standard externality 
insofar as non-market participants (often called residents of 
Main Street, as distinguished from residents of Wall Street) 
suffer from the actions of market participants. 
This market failure is not unique to securitization.  
Indeed, it is one of the fundamental reasons why the private 
sector does not adequately constrain systemic risk; the duty 
of managers of systemically important firms to shareholders 
is potentially misaligned with societal interests.
99
  Regulators 
do not yet recognize this fundamental failure; even members 
of Dodd-Frank-mandated risk committees, regulated by the 
U.S. Federal Reserve, are only required to view the expected 
value of corporate risk taking from the standpoint of a firm’s 
investors, largely ignoring systemic externalities.
100
 
To help correct this market failure, I have argued—in a 
broader financial context—that managers of systemically 
important firms should not only have their traditional 
corporate governance duty to investors but also a “public 
governance duty” to society, not to engage in excessive risk 
taking that could systemically harm the public.
101
 
B. Addressing the Market-Failure Causes that Apply 
Distinctively to Securitization 
Of the five fundamental market-failure causes identified, 
two—complexity and change—can have distinctive 
application to securitization.  The others apply to 
securitization, but in no way that is substantively different 
from how they apply to finance more generally.  I therefore 
focus below on complexity and change. 
1. Addressing ‘Complexity’ 
Many European securitized products fared relatively well 
throughout the financial crisis, compared with more complex 
 
Systemic risk represents risk to the financial system itself: the risk that a 
cascading failure of financial system components (e.g., markets or firms) 
undermines the system’s ability to generate capital, or increases the cost of 
capital, thereby harming the real economy.  Id. at 207–08. 
 
99
 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and 
Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2016) (manuscript at 
4–5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644375 [https://perma.cc/7CLQ-FUJ2] 
(arguing that, from the perspective of systemic harm, corporate governance 
law misaligns the interests of firms and their investors, on the one hand, and 
the public on the other hand). 
 
100
 Id. (manuscript at 4–5, 18 n.66). 
 
101
 Id. (manuscript at 27–28). 
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U.S. originated securitized products.
102
  The STS proposal 
implicitly recognizes this,
103
 incentivizing STS securitizations 
by reducing regulatory capital requirements for investors in 
those securitizations.  As mentioned,
104
 I believe that makes 
sense because STS securitizations reflect the basic types of 
securitization transactions that became one of the dominant 
means of capital formation during the 1990s. 
I have previously regarded attempts to standardize 
financial products as inefficient.
105
  Innovation can be 
important in order to meet the needs of different parties.  
The STS proposal is a reasonable compromise because it is 
optional and does not prohibit experimentation and financial 
innovation.
106
 
 
 
102
 See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK & BANK OF ENGLAND, THE IMPAIRED EU 
SECURITIZATION MARKET: CAUSES, ROADBLOCKS, AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM 3 
(2014), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb-
boe_impaired_eu_securitization_marketen.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF8E-RN3Z] 
(stating that European structured products performed “substantially better 
than US peers” and that, for the period between July 2007 and September 
2013, the cumulative default rate was 1.5% for European structured products 
as compared to 18.4% for U.S. structured products). 
 
103
 Richard Hopkin, Head of Fixed Income, AFME, Keynote address to 
ASIFMA Structured Finance Conference 2015 (Oct. 15, 2015), 
www.afme.eu/WorkArea//DownloadAsset.aspx?id=13306 
[https://perma.cc/9PAQ-X4PX]. 
 
104
 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 
105
 See Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 240 (arguing that mandated 
standardization would have unintended negative effects and increase 
uncertainty); Schwarcz, supra note 89 102, at 820 (“[T]he overall economic 
impact of standardization is unclear because standardization can stifle 
innovation and interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the efficiencies 
that arise when firms craft financial products tailored to the particular needs 
and risk preferences of investors.”). 
 
106
 But cf. GLOB. FIN. MKTS. ASSOC., INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASSOC., INST. OF INT’L 
FIN. & ISDA, RESPONSE TO BCBS/IOSCO CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT ON CRITERIA 
FOR IDENTIFYING SIMPLE, TRANSPARENT AND COMPARABLE SECURITISATIONS 19 
(2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d304/giii.pdf (“The 
requirement for historical data would mean it would be very hard for any new 
asset classes or even traditional asset classes in new jurisdictions to be treated 
as STC.  This is a significant barrier to the development of securitisation 
markets and one which could have the opposite effect from that intended by 
the development of the STC regime as a whole.”).  While this is discussing the 
separately proposed STC framework, see supra notes 32–33 and 
accompanying text discussing the relationship between the STS and STC 
frameworks, the criterion it criticizes is analogous to STS Transparency 
Criterion 1.  See EU-proposed regulations, supra note 30, at 39 (“The 
originator, sponsor, and SSPE shall provide access to data on static and 
dynamic historical default and loss performance, such as delinquency and 
default data, for substantially similar exposures to those being securitised to 
the investor before investing.  Those data shall cover a period no shorter than 
seven years for non-retail exposures and five years for retail exposures.  The 
basis for claiming similarity shall be disclosed.” (emphasis added)). 
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This does not mean the STS proposal is perfect.  Some 
critics are concerned that the ability of originators and 
sponsors to self-designate their securitizations as 
STS-compliant will distort the designation and motivate 
fraud.
107
  Moreover, the fact that the STS proposal does not 
prohibit financial experimentation and innovation is a two-
edged sword: such experimentation and innovation can 
sometimes increase efficiency, but it also permits the 
development of non-standardized complex securitization that 
could increase systemic risk.  Ex ante regulation of 
securitization therefore should be supplemented by ex post 
regulation that mitigates systemic consequences.
108
 
2. Addressing ‘Change’ 
In the financial crisis, the almost exclusive emphasis on 
bank regulation failed to adequately address the 
disintermediation created by securitization.  Similarly, the 
regulation of securitization, especially in the United States, 
is primarily tied to the past and current financial 
architecture, where the primary financial asset underlying 
ABS is mortgage loans.
109
  Witness the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
preoccupation with regulating mortgage lending.
110
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 Keith Mullin, STS Self-Certification? Barking Up the Wrong Tree, INT’L 
FIN. REV. (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.ifre.com/sts-self-certification-barking-
up-the-wrong-tree/21213725.fullarticle [https://perma.cc/9YBY-WLJ8].  Self-
designation is currently the only proposed method of STS designation.  The 
potential for abuse of such designation may be mitigated by the requirement 
that investors undertake sufficient due diligence to determine “with regard to 
securitisations designated as STS, whether the securitisation meets the STS 
requirements laid down in” such regulations.  See EU-proposed regulations, 
supra note 30, at 30.  Some suggest that private sector independent third 
parties should oversee the STS designation.  See, e.g., THE PCS SECRETARIAT, 
CERTIFICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITISATION 
6 (May 13, 2015), http://pcsmarket.org/wp-
content/uploads/publications/b415f/Certification_in_the_Context_of_a_Regul
atory_Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LMS-MF2T]. 
 
108
 See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law 
Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 102 
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We cannot predict, however, the types of financial assets 
that in the future will underlie ABS.  Rights to payment in 
the form of loans are typically significant asset categories.  
Any type of loan can include subprime borrowers if—as in a 
bubble
111—borrowers become enamored with investing in a 
particular type of asset and lenders believe that asset value 
will inevitably increase.  As a parallel to the subprime 
mortgage lending that preceded the financial crisis,
112
 
consider the subprime margin lending that was a causal 
factor of the Great Depression.
113
 
“Prior to the Depression, many banks engaged in margin 
lending to risky borrowers, securing the loans by shares of 
stock that the borrowers purchased with the loan 
proceeds.”114  The value of the stock collateral started out 
being at least equal to the amount of the loan, and banks 
assumed that the stock market, which had been 
continuously rising in value for some years, would continue 
to rise, or at least not decline, in value.
115
  “At the time, that 
assumption was viewed as reasonable.”116  “In August 1929, 
however, there was a (relatively) modest decline in stock 
prices, causing some of these margin loans to become 
under-collateralized.”117  Some banks that were heavily 
engaged in margin lending then lost so much money on the 
loans that they themselves became unable to pay their 
debts, including the debts they owed to other banks.  As a 
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result, defaults by these margin-lending banks adversely 
affected the other banks’ ability to meet their obligations, 
starting a chain of bank failures.
118
 
Just as we cannot always predict changes in the types of 
financial assets that will be securitized in the future, 
financial change can also evolve incrementally without 
critical recognition of the increasing risk.  In examining the 
origin of the financial crisis, for example, Professor Judge 
argues that the myopic focus of market participants and 
regulators on the latest incremental developments prevented 
them from viewing the “big picture” and taking account of 
layered complexity and its attendant systemic risk.
119
 
The lesson is that change can create failures that cannot 
be fully predicted.  As a result, systemic consequences may 
be inevitable.  Again, this means that ex ante regulation of 
securitization should be supplemented by ex post regulation 
that mitigates those consequences.
120
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Because securitization’s abuses contributed to the global 
financial crisis, its regulation is critically important.  U.S. 
and, to a lesser extent, European post-crisis regulation of 
securitization is insufficient, however, because the post-
crisis macroprudential regulation of finance is political and 
ad hoc.  To achieve a more systematic regulatory framework, 
this Essay argues for supplementing existing regulation by 
trying to address the market-failure causes that apply 
distinctively to securitization. 
Two fundamental market-failure causes—complexity 
and change—can apply distinctively to securitization.  
Europe’s STS proposal goes a long way towards addressing 
complexity; the United States should consider a similar 
regulatory approach.
121
  However, because the STS proposal 
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does not—and to protect efficiency, should not—prohibit 
financial experimentation and innovation, complexity can 
still trigger systemic collapses.  Similarly, because change 
cannot be fully predicted, it cannot be fully regulated; and it 
too, has the potential to trigger systemic collapses.  For 
these reasons, ex ante regulation of securitization should be 
supplemented by ex post regulation that mitigates those 
consequences. 
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